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COMMUNITY PROPERTY-WASHINGTON ALLOWS SEPARATE TORT RECOVERY FROM COMMUNITY PROPERTY-deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn.

2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980).
Historically, community property was exempt in Washington from satisfying judgments arising from separate torts. Separate torts are -those that
do not arise from management of community property or do not provide
any benefit to the community. ' Since 19172 victims of separate torts had
no means of satisfying judgments against solvent, married tortfeasors unless sufficient separate property was available. 3 In 1980 the Washington
Supreme Court, in deElche v. Jacobsen,4 reconsidered the justification
for the exemption, and concluded that community property should be
available to satisfy separate tort judgments.
Plaintiff deElche was awarded damages in a civil action for rape. Because the trial court determined the tort was separate, 5 recovery was allowed from defendant's separate property only. 6 The Jacobsens had executed a valid community property agreement converting all of their
separate property into community property, leaving the judgment uncollectible. 7 Reversing a long-standing rule, the Washington Supreme Court
1. The tortfeasor spouse was separately liable for his or her tort, whether separate or community,
but the availability of community property to satisfy a judgment depended on whether the tortious act
was committed in the course of managing community property or was committed for the benefit of
the community. Cross, The Community PropertyLaw in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REv. 729, 834
(1974). See Pruzan, Community Propertyand Tort Liability in Washington, 23 WASH. L. REV. 259
(1948); part I.A. infra.
2. In 1917 the Washington Supreme Court rejected the proposition that community personal
property should be available for a judgment on a husband's separate tort and overruled prior decisions
allowing recovery from community personal property for the husband's separate debt. Schramm v.
Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 314-18, 166 P. 634, 636-37 (1917). See part I.A. infra.
3. Because of the presumption in favor of community ownership, this has frequently meant that
no recovery for the victim has been possible. See Yesler v. Hochstettler, 4 Wash. 349, 353-54, 30 P.
398, 399 (1892) (assets acquired for consideration during marriage are presumed to be community
property, rebuttable only by clear and convincing proof that they were acquired in such a way as to be
separate property). See also Cross, supranote 1, at 746-47.
4. 95 Wn. 2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980).
5. Id. at 238, 622 P.2d at 836.
6. The trial court determined that the tort was separate. On appeal the supreme court did not
analyze the issue, although it was presented to the court. See Brief for Appellant at 23, deElche v.
Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980).
7. By statute, community property agreements shall "not derogate from the right of creditors."
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1979). Once an agreement is executed, however, subsequent creditors' rights are the same as if the property had originally been community property. In dissent, Justice
Horowitz suggested that an alternative to overruling the separate tort rule would have been to hold
that such an agreement did not prevent a separate judgment creditor from levying against property
which would be separate except for the agreement. 95 Wn. 2d at 252, 622 P.2d at 844. See Cross,
supra note I, at 805. See generally Brachtenbach, Community Property Agreements: Many Questions, Few Answers, 37 WASH. L. REv.469 (1962).
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held that if the tortfeasor's separate property is insufficient to satisfy a
separate judgment, the tortfeasor's one-half interest in community personal property can be reached. 8 The court further held that if resort to
community personal property is necessary, upon dissolution of the community relationship the innocent spouse has a right of reimbursement protected by an equitable lien. 9
With the deElche decision, Washington joined the majority of community property states, 1 0 but did not address several important questions,
which will be the subject of this note. This note begins by reviewing prior
case law and the structure of community property ownership in general.
An analysis of the majority and dissenting I opinions in deElche follows.
The majority's reasoning and the impact of the decision will then be analyzed. The note concludes that the deElche holding is basically sound, but
that the lack of clarity in the opinion leaves several community property
questions unsettled.
1.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

Tort Liabiliy

Under early Washington law, community personal property could be
sold to satisfy the husband's separate contractual debts.12 The basis for
this rule was the husband's absolute management and control of personal
property.1 3 Real property, on the other hand, was subject to the requirement of joinder or consent by the wife in voluntary transactions and the
statutory limitations on subjecting community real estate to community

8.

95Wn. 2dat246,622P.2dat840.

9. Id. at 246, 622 P.2d at 840. The non-tortfeasor spouse will hold as separate property the same
amount as he or she would have received had the separate tort judgment not been satisfied out of

community property. The equitable lien will also protect the remaining community property from
subsequent separate judgment creditors attempting to levy on the remaining half of the property. Id.
at 246-47, 622 P.2d at 840.

10. See. e.g., CAL. CtV. CODE § 5122 (West Supp. 1980); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2345.
2364, 2365 (West 1981); N.M. STAT, ANN. § 40-3-10 (1978); TEX. FAst. CODE ANN. tit. I, § 5.61
(Vernon 1975); Cirac v. Lander County, 602 P.2d 1012, 1017 (Nev. 1979). After the deElche decision, only Arizona and Idaho provide separate tort victims no access to community property. See
Schilling v. Embree, 118 Ariz. 236, 575 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1978); Hansen v. Blevin. 84 Idaho 49.
367 P.2d 758, 760 (1962) (unnecessary to determine whether community property available to satisfy
separate tort judgments, as court ruled the tort to be community in nature).
I1. Justice Horowitz dissented. 95 Wn. 2d at 248, 622 P.2d at 841.
12. Powell v. Pugh, 13 Wash. 577, 578, 43 P. 879, 879 (1896), overruled by Schramm v.
Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 318, 166 P. 634, 638 (1917).
13.
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debts. 14 Real property was thus excluded from satisfying the husband's
debts. 15
The Washington Supreme Court rejected the reasoning that personal
property could be used to satisfy the husband's debts in 1917 in Schramm
v. Steele, 16 a case involving separate tort liability. 17 The court found that
the theoretical basis of community liability for the acts of the husband
was respondeat superior,18 based on the then-prevailing view that the
marital community was a distinct legal entity.19 Under this analysis, the
"entity" was the principal to the agent husband, and it owned the property. Because a principal is not liable for acts committed by an agent outside the scope of authority, the court held that community property was
reachable only when the husband had acted for the benefit of the "entity. "20 Thus the court held that community property, whether real or
personal, was not available for execution on a judgment for a separate
obligation arising in tort or contract. 2' Consistent with the "entity" theory of ownership, and the agent/principal relationship of the husband to
the community, community property was only available to satisfy a tort
judgment if the tort was committed during the course of managing com23
munity property 22 or provided some benefit to the community.
14. See Brotton v. Langert, I Wash. 73, 79-80, 23 P. 688, 688-89 (1890); WASH. TERR. CODE
ch. 183, § 2410 (precluding husband from alienation of community real estate without the joinder of
the wife, and providing that community real estate is subject to liens for community debts). Current
legislation also precludes unilateral alienation of community real estate, and provides that community
real estate is subject to liens for community debts. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 26.16.030(3), .040 (1979).
15. Brotton v. Langert, 1 Wash. 73, 79-80,23 P. 688,688-89(1890).
16. 97 Wash. 309, 166 P. 634 (1917).
17. The plaintiff argued that since persons having claims to tort damages had been held to be
creditors of the tortfeasor, a separate tort creditor should be able to reach community personal property, as could creditors with contract claims. The Schramm court rejected the suggested distinctions
both between contractual and tortious liability, and between real and personal property, and held that
a separate creditor could not levy against any community property. 97 Wash. at 314-15, 166 P. at
636-37. For an analysis of these distinctions, which may have been revived by deElche, see part III
infra.
18. 97 Wash. at 313-15, 166 P. at636.
19. See id.; Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 731, 31 P. 24, 24 (1892).
20. The wife incurred liability either, by acting under emergency powers of management, see
Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 133, 159 P. I11, 113 (1916), or by acting as agent in the purchase of
daily necessities, see Werker v. Knox, 197 Wash. 453, 459-60, 85 P.2d 1041, 1044 (1938). With
the advent of equal management in 1972, the analysis for the husband also applies to the wife. See
Cross, supra note 1, at 789.
21. 97 Wash. at 316-17, 166 P. at 636-37.
22. See Hartman v. Anderson, 49 Wn. 2d 154, 298 P.2d 1103 (1956) (community held liable for
wife's misrepresentation to buyer of boundary lines on property); McHenry v. Short, 29 Wn. 2d 263,
186 P.2d 900 (1947) (defendant husband fatally assaulted plaintiff attempting to eject him from community property); De Phillips v. Neslin, 139 Wash. 51, 245 P. 749 (1926) (community liable for
tortious slander, assault, and malicious prosecution in attempt to recover from plaintiff property allegedly stolen from the community business); Miller v. Gerry, 81 Wash. 217, 142 P. 668 (1914)
(community liable for fraudulent misrepresentation made by the husband during the sale of commu-
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view of community ownership was rejected in 1930.24

Under current law, each spouse owns a presently vested one-half interest
in each item of community property. 25 The rejection of the "entity" theory of ownership destroyed the agent/principal analysis, 26 but the
Schranrn rules of community and separate liability remained.
Predictably, case law proliferated on the question whether specific tortious acts should be viewed as community or separate. 2 7 In 1938 the
Washington Supreme Court recognized a trend toward finding ways to
make community property available to tort judgment creditors. 28 Consequently, the court broadly interpreted the requirement that a tortious act
29
provide some community benefit to include not only pecuniary benefits,
30 and community purpose. 3'
but also community recreation
The result has been that community liability has been found in most
cases except those involving purely personal altercations 32 and alienation

nity-owned real estate), Blais v. Phillips, 7 Wn. App. 815. 502 P.2d 1245 (1972) (defendant assaulted plaintiff in court parking lot; community liable because the trial concerned community property, and the wife allegedly supported him); Benson v. Bush, 3 Wn. App. 277, 477 P.2d 929 (1970)
(during dogfight, defendant sprayed plaintiff's dog and plaintiff with chemicals: community liable
because altercation part of continuing dispute over community property).
23. For example, acts committed in the course of employment give rise to community liability.
E.g.. Brink v. Griffith, 65 Wn. 2d 253. 396 P.2d 793 (1964): LaFramboise v. Schmidt. 42 Wn. 2d
198, 254 P.2d 485 (1947); McHenry v. Short, 29 Wn. 2d 263. 186 P.2d 900 (1947): Jacobson v.
Lawrence, 9 Wn. App. 786, 514 P.2d 1396 (1973).
24. Bortle v. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585. 589-90, 285 P. 425,427 (1930). Originally. the analysis
had been that the legislature created a statutory entity. Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309. 315. 166 P.
634. 637 (1917); Brotton v. Langert, I Wash. 73, 78, 23 P. 688. 688 (1890). The Bortle court
rejected this, holding that the statutory scheme merely classified the character of the property. 155
Wash. at 589, 285 P. at 427.
25. deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 237, 243-44, 622 P.2d 835, 838-39 (1980): In re Estate of
Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 471-76, 494 P.2d 238, 242-45, appeal denied, 80 Wn. 2d 1009 (1972).
See also United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1972); In re Towey's Estate. 22 Wn. 2d
212, 214, 155 P.2d 273. 275 (1945).
26. See Cross. supra note I,at 835.
27. See notes 22 & 23 supra (examples of cases).
28. Werkerv. Knox, 197 Wash. 453, 456, 85 P.2d 1041, 1042(1938).
29. Torts committed during the course of employment are an example. See cases cited in note 23
supra.
30. The reasoning is that legitimate recreational activities promote the general welfare of the
community. E.g., Moffitt v. Krueger, 11 Wn. 2d 658, 661, 120 P.2d 512, 513-14 (1941) (quoting
King v. Williams, 188 Wash. 350. 356, 62 P.2d 710,710(1936)).
31.
See, e.g., Werker v. Knox, 197 Wash. 453, 85 P.2d 1041 (1938).
32. Cross, supra note 1.at 836. See, e.g., Verstraelen v. Kellog, 60 Wn. 2d 115.372 P.2d 543
(1962); Smith v. Retallick. 48 Wn. 2d 360, 293 P.2d 745 (1956): Newberry v. Remington. 184
Wash. 665, 52 P.2d 312 (1935) (cases finding separate liability where husband was driving family
car, with spouse in the car, because the auto was not used as the instrument by which the tortious act
was committed).
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of affections.33 Even though a broad interpretation of community benefit
now prevails, the deElche court did not attempt to reason that the rape
34
committed by Jacobsen fell into this category.
B.

Structureof Community PropertyOwnership

Before the deElche decision, Washington courts consistently held that
one spouse could not use community property for his or her separate purposes. For example, an attempt unilaterally to give away community
property is conclusively void ab initio.35 The courts were less strict with
tort liability, allowing imposition on the community when some type of
community benefit was shown. 36 The court was most liberal with contractual debts, presuming that community liability existed. 37 This pre38
sumption was rebuttable by proof of purely separate benefit.
The legislature also has restricted use of community property for separate purposes. The statutory joinder requirements for transactions involving community real estate, 39 community business transactions, 40 and
household appliances 4 1 serve to protect each spouse from loss through the
other's unprincipled decisions involving important assets.
33. Cross, supra note I, at 836. See, e.g., Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 P. 634 (1917)
(alienation of affection); AichImayer v. Lynch, 6 Wn. App. 434, 493 P.2d 1026 (1972) (same). The
Washington Supreme Court, in 1980, abolished the cause of action for alienation of a spouse's affections. Wyman v. Wallace, 91 Wn. 2d 99, 105, 625 P.2d 452,455 (1980).
34. Appellant argued that the rape in the instant case fell within the community recreation rule
because appellant deElche had been socializing with both Jacobsen and his wife prior to the incident,
and the assault had taken place while Jacobsen was in an intoxicated state as a result of the socializing. See Brief for Appellant at 23, deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980).
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(2) (1979); Parker v. Parker, 121 Wash. 24, 28, 207 P. 10,
13 (1922); See also it re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 474-75, 494 P.2d 238, 244, appeal
denied, 80 Wn. 2d 1009 (1972), wherein an explanation of the reasoning behind the rule was given:
under the "item" theory each spouse owns an undivided one-half interest in each item of property;
therefore if one spouse could make inter vivos gifts of community property without the consent of the
other, the whole of the community property would be lessened, in violation of the rights of the nongiving spouse. Id. at 475, 494 P.2d at 244. See note 93 and accompanying text infra. Some federal
law exceptions exist. See, e.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (treasury regulation creating
right of survivorship in United States Savings Bonds preempts inconsistent state community property
law); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (federal law controls effectiveness of beneficiary
designation of National Service Life Insurance).
36. See notes 23, 29-30 and accompanying text supra.
37. The ordinary debt transaction will involve acquiring an asset, which raises the basic presumption that property acquired for consideration during marriage is community in nature. See Yesler
v. Hochstettler, 4 Wash. 349, 30 P. 398 (1892). Correlatively, the obligation incurred is presumptively community in nature. See, e.g., Oregon Improvement Co. v. Sagmiester, 4 Wash. 710, 30 P.
1058 (1892).
38. See, e.g., Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wn. 2d 68,70,272 P.2d 626,627 (1954).
39. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 26.16.030(3), .040 (1979).
40. Id. § 26.16.030(6).
41. Id. § 26.16.030(5).
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It is not until the relationship is dissolved by death 42 or divorce 43 that
each spouse attains independent dispositive control over his or her half of
the property. Thus, although each spouse is said to "own" one-half of
the community assets, 44 this ownership is not absolute. By allowing recovery from community property, even though no benefit accrued to the
community, the deElche court departed from the protective model of the
court and the legislature. The effect of this departure on community property law will depend on subsequent interpretation of the questions left
unanswered by the deElche court.
II.

THE deELCHE COURT'S REASONING

The deElche court began by observing that the analysis employed in
Washington to determine the community or separate character of a tort
has yielded unpredictable and unjust results. 45 It declined to change the
characterization rules, however. 46 Instead, it relied upon the rejection of
the "entity" theory of community ownership. 47 Because this rejection
established ownership in the spouses of an undivided one-half interest in
the community assets, the court found no reason why property owned by
a person should be exempt from tort judgments. 4 8 Support for the holding

42. At death, disposition is limited by strict application of the "'item" theory of ownership.
precluding one spouse from devising more than one-half of each asset to someone other than the
surviving spouse. In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 477,494 P.2d 238 245, appeal denied, 80
Wn. 2d 1009 (1972). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(l) (1979) (limiting disposition of

community property to one-half, but not indicating if the half can be measured as half of the aggregate estate or as half of each item).
43.

At divorce, the trial judge has great discretion in awarding property, and is not limited by the

characterization of property as separate or community. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1979): In
re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn.2d 649, 565 P.2d 790 (1977).

44.

See note 25 and accompanying text supra.

45.

95 Wn. 2d at 242, 622 P.2d at 838. See, e.g., LaFramboise v. Schmidt, 42 Wn. 2d 198. 254

P.2d 485 (1953) (community liability found where husband committed indecent liberties upon a child
staying in home); Moffit v. Kruegar, II Wn. 2d 658, 120 P.2d 512 (1941) (community liability
where wife permitted a male friend with whom she had been drinking to drive the community auto-

mobile and his negligent driving caused an accident).
46. Justice Horowitz, in dissent, suggested that the extensive review of cases undertaken by the
majority distinguishing separate and community torts was superfluous, given the fact that the majority failed to resolve the underlying problem that it raised. 95 Wn. 2d at 248 n.5, 622 P.2d at 841 n.5.
See note 65 and accompanying text infra.
47. 95 Wn.2d at 242-44, 622 P.2d at 838-39.
48.
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came from Spanish law, from which community property evolved, 49 and
50
from the absence of statutory barriers.
The court's purpose in making the change was to continue to impose
liability on the community when the tort is committed for the benefit of
the community, to protect the property of the innocent spouse if the tort is
separate, and to allow recovery by the victim of a solvent tortfeasor. 5 1 To
implement these goals the court retained the distinction between community and separate torts,52 but changed existing law to allow the victim of a
separate tort to recover to the extent of tlhe tortfeasor's one-half interest in
community personal property. 53 Although the court held that property remaining after satisfaction of the judgment retains its community character, 54 it protected the innocent spouse with a right of reimbursement, pro55
tected by an equitable lien, arising upon dissolution of the community.
The court left three questions unanswered: first, whether real property
would also be subject to execution; 56 second, whether contractual debts
will be treated differently from tort judgments; 57 and third, precisely how
the judgment will be enforced and the right of reimbursement imple58
mented.
Justice Horowitz, in dissent, was sharply critical of the majority's reasoning. He objected especially to the court's justifying the rule change in
terms of present ownership. He suggested that the majority confused the
concept of ownership with the availability of property for immediate pos49. Id. at 244, 622 P.2d at 839. See, e.g., In re Estate of Salvini, 65 Wn. 2d 442, 447-48, 397
P.2d 811, 814 (1964). Spanish law allowed tort victims of married persons to recover from the
wrongdoer's separate property and his or her one-half interest in community property. deElche v.
Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 237, 244, 622 P.2d 835, 839 (1980) (citing Novfsma Recopilaci6n, 1805 A.D.
Book 10, Title 4, De los Bienes Ganaciales o Adquiridos en el Matrimonio, Law 10, quoted in 2 W.
DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY app. I (1943)). See W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN,
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 181 (2d ed. 1971).

50. 95 Wn. 2d at 244, 622 P.2d at 839. The only statute cited by the court for this proposition
was R.C.W. § 26.16.190, which provides that the separate property of the non-tortfeasor spouse is
immune from recovery except where there would be joint liability if the marriage did not exist. The
court apparently overlooked R.C.W. § 26.16.040, which provides that community real estate is liable for community debts and, by implication, that community real estate is not liable for separate
debts. See note 89 and accompanying text infra.
51. 95 Wn. 2d at 244-45, 622 P.2d at 839.
52. See generally note 46 supra.
53. 95 Wn. 2d at 246, 622 P.2d at 840.
54. Id.
55. Id. See generally part III. C. infra.
56. 95 Wn. 2d at 246, 622 P.2d at 840. The determination was unnecessary because it was
undisputed that the defendant owned sufficient personal property to satisfy the judgment. See generally part Ill. B. infra (discussion of the validity of distinguishing between real and personal property).
57. 95 Wn. 2d at 246 n.3, 622 P.2d at 840 n.3. See generally part III. A. infra (discussion of the
validity of distinguishing between contractual debts and tort liabilities).
58. 95 Wn. 2d at 247 n.4, 622 P.2d at 840 n.4.
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sessory satisfaction. 59 Citing gift cases 60 and the treatment of community
assets at divorce, 6 1 he accused the majority of eroding the unique protective function of Washington community property law. 62 Because the majority's analysis could be extended to contractual debts, encumbrances for
non-community benefits, and gratuitous transfers, Justice Horowitz
feared that community property ownership could be reduced to a form of
cotenancy, divisible at the will or whim of a spouse or of his or her credi63
tors.
Justice Horowitz preferred solving the old rule's problems by awaiting
legislative action, 64 because of the difficult policy determinations to be
resolved in such a major change in the law.
III.

ANALYSIS

The deElche court directed its analysis to two problems: first, the difficulty of distinguishing between separate and community torts; and second, the inequity of denying recovery to tort victims of those solvent tortfeasors who hold only community property.
The impact of the decision on the first problem will be negligible. The
court did suggest, however, that torts previously classified as community
might now be classified as separate because the increased availability of
recovery would remove judicial reluctance to rule that a tort is separate. 65
Although the analysis is still necessary because victims of separate torts
are restricted to one-half of the community property, whereas victims of
community torts may recover from all of the community property, the
court provided no direction to future decision-makers as to how the determination can be made in a more consistent and equitable manner. The
likely effect of the opinion will be only to aid those persons in the position
of plaintiff deElche-those victims of torts unquestionably separate.
59.

Id. at 249,622 P.2d at 841.

60. E.g., Nimey v. Nimey, 182 Wash. 194, 45 P.2d 949 (1935) (purported gift of community
property made by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse void). See note 35 and accompanying text supra.

61. See generally In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d 649, 656, 565 P.2d 790, 794 (1977)
(characterization of the property is not necessarily controlling; the ultimate question is whether the
final division of the property is fair, just and equitable under all circumstances) WASH. REV. CODE §
26.16.080 (1979).
62. 95 Wn. 2d at 251, 622 P.2d at 842.
63. Id. But see part III. A. infra.
64. 95 Wn. 2d at 252, 622 P.2d at 843. But see Smith v. Retallick, 48 Wn. 2d 360, 365, 293
P.2d 745, 747 (1956); Aichlmayr v. Lynch, 6 Wn. App. 434, 435, 493 P.2d 1026, 1027 (1972) (in
both cases the court declined to overturn the separate tort rule in the absence of legislative action,
indicating the legislature has been reluctant to act in this area).
65. 95 Wn. 2d at 245, 622 P.2d at 840. See Smith v. Retallick, 48 Wn. 2d 360, 365, 293 P.2d
745, 748 (1956) (Finley, J., dissenting).
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The deElche result is sound with respect to the second problem, the
compensation of tort victims. It comports with the policy declared in
1972 by the Washington Supreme Court, that "absent express statutory
provision, or compelling public policy, the law should not immunize tortfeasors or deny remedy to their victims. ',66 The deElche court found no
contrary statutory provision expressly precluding levy on community assets for separate torts. 67 With the demise of the "entity" theory, protection of the "entity" from the derelictions of the spouse was unneces68
sary.
The sole policy justification left for the rule was the protection of the
innocent spouse. 69 The court lessened the impact of the decision on the
innocent spouse by providing a right of reimbursement, protected by an
70
equitable lien, to arise upon dissolution of the community.
The flaw in the decision, as identified by Justice Horowitz, is that the
court attempted to fit the new separate tort recovery rule within the existing scheme of ownership, 7 1 leaving three important questions unresolved:
first, whether the rule will be extended to contractual debts; second,
whether real property will also be subject to execution on a separate tort
judgment; and third, how precisely the judgment will be enforced and
right of reimbursement implemented.
A.

Limiting the Decision to Tort Judgments

The deElche court premised the change in the rule of separate tort recovery on the concept of present individual ownership. 72 If ownership
were in fact the dispositive factor, it would be equally logical to extend
the deElche rule to contractual debts. 73 Gratuitous transfers would also be
eligible, 74 fulfilling Justice Horowitz's apprehension that community
property ownership will be reduced to cotenancy, partitionable at will. 75
Justice Horowitz's fears are unfounded, however.
Although the court's analysis can theoretically be extended beyond the
tort situation, policy and statutory differences exist. The deElche court
66. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wn. 2d 183, 192,500 P.2d 771,777(1972).
67. But see note 82 and accompanying text infra.
68. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
69. See Brotton v. Langert, 1 Wash. 73, 80, 23 P. 688, 688-89 (1890). The deElche court did
not expressly identify protection of the innocent spouse as one of the policy goals of the rule.
70. See part III. C. infra.
71. See deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 236, 249-50, 622 P.2d 835, 841-42 (1980) (Horowitz,
J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 244, 622 P.2d at 839. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
73. Id. at 251, 622 P.2d at 843 (Horowitz, J., dissenting).
74. But see WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(2) (1979).
75. deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 236, 249-50, 622 P.2d 835, 842-43 (1980).
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suggested that contractual debts would be treated differently. 76 This
would mark a return to a distinction between contractual and tortious liability abandoned as "absurd" in 1917 by the court in Schranm v.
Steele. 77 The distinction is, actually, well founded. Torts, since they involve an innocent injured victim and a negligent or intentionally injurious
tortfeasor, present a unique situation. In contrast, both parties enter a contract voluntarily and have a measure of control over the legal consequences of their acts. There is already a strong presumption of community liability when a married person enters a contract, eliminating the
element of unpredictability present in the tort situation. Thus, the equities
presented by the separate tort judgment-holder 78 are lacking in a contract
case, and a court should treat the two situations differently.
Because of the strict statutory joinder requirements for transactions involving community real property, 7 9 community business assets, 80 and
household appliances, 8 1 to allow contractual creditors of solely separate
debts access to these assets would give them more than the benefit of their
bargain. These joinder requirements indicate a legislative policy to protect community assets from voluntary depletion by one spouse, and to
82
permit access to them would seem to be precluded by the legislation.
Gratuitous transfers, as well, would not be covered by the deElche rule
83
because unilateral gifts are forbidden by statute.
B.

Real Property versus PersonalProperty

The deElche court may also have renewed the importance of the distinction between real and personal property for satisfying separate obligations. 84 This distinction is valid. Although a spouse's management powers over community personal property must be exercised in the
community interest, 85 the law permits wide discretion here and the com76. Id. at 246 n.3. 622 P.2d at 840 n.3. But see Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Lapp. 95 Wn.
2d 341, 622 P.2d 850 (1981 1. In that case. the Washington court cited deElche as contrary authority
to the proposition that the community property cannot be reached for payment of separate debts. Id.
at 344, 622 P.2d at 854. The court also referred to tort liability as a debt. indicating that the court may

fail to recognize the distinction. Id. at 347 n.2, 622 P.2d at 855-56 n.2.
77. 97Wash. 309,314. 166 P. 634. 636(1917). See note 17supra.
78. The equities identified by the deElche court were that the tort victim may be denied recovery
based on tenuous distinctions. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
79. WASH. Rtv. CODE § 26.16.030(3) (1979).
80. Id. § 26.16.030(6).
81.
Id. § 26.16.030(5).
82. See Brotton v. Langert. I Wash. 73. 23 P. 688 (1890).
83.
WAsLt. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(2) (1979).
84. This distinction was also abandoned by the Washington court in 1917. Schramm v. Steele.
97 Wash. 309. 315-16. 166 P. 636. 636-37 (1917). See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
85. Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 315. 166 P. 634. 637(1917): Cross. supra note 1. at 788
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plaining spouse must show that this discretion was abused to overturn any
such decision. 86 With real property, by contrast, the statutory requirement of joinder in voluntary transactions allows a spouse to void decisions made without his or her joinder or consent. 87 Also by statute, community real property is subject to judgment liens recovered for
community debts. 88 By implication, this section precludes subjecting
community real estate to judgment liens recovered for separate torts or
debts. 89 These statutes lend validity to a renewal of the distinction between the use of real and personal property to satisfy separate judgments.
C. Enforcement of the Judgment: Conflict with Community Property
Theory
Under deElche, if community property is used to satisfy a separate tort
judgment, there arises a right of reimbursement protected by an equitable
lien. 90 Upon dissolution of the community relationship the non-tortfeasor
spouse will hold as separate property the same amount as he or she would
have received had the judgment not been satisfied out of community property. 91 This equitable lien will also protect the community, pro tanto,
from subsequent separate judgment creditors attempting to levy on the
92
remaining half of the property.
One difficulty with the court's reasoning is the means of enforcing the
judgment without levying on the property of the innocent spouse. Under
the "item" theory of ownership 93 each spouse owns an indivisible onehalf interest in each item of community property; the sale of any asset to
satisfy a judgment thus necessarily includes the sale of the innocent
spouse's property as well as that of the tortfeasor spouse. The court was
86. See, e.g., Hanley v. Most, 9 Wvn. 2d 429, 459-60, 115 P.2d 933; 945 (1941); Bellingham
Motors Corp. v. Lindberg, 126 Wash. 684, 686-87, 219 P. 19, 19-20 (1923).
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (3) (1979).
88. Id. § 26.16.040.
89. See Brotton v. Langert, I Wash. 73, 79-80, 23 P. 688, 689 (1890) (construing similar provision); note 14 and accompanying text supra. By further implication "debts" as used in this provision
could be read to exclude tortious liability.
90. 95 Wn. 2d at 246-47, 622 P.2d at 840. The right of reimbursement has generally been
applied where community property has been used to improve a separate estate. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Harshman, 18 Wn. App. 116, 567 P.2d 677 (1977) (community given right of reimbursement when community funds were used to pay the principal on a separate mortgage). See generally
Cross, supra note I, at 776-82.
91. deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 237, 246-47, 622 P.2d 835, 840(1980).
92. Id. at 247, 622 P.2d at 840. The court appears to give the innocent spouse a priority against
subsequent separate tort creditors. See Cross, supra note 1, at 776.
93. The fact that the "item" theory of ownership is followed in Washington was explicitly recognized in In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 476,494 P.2d 238, 245, appeal denied, 80 Wn.
2d 1009 (1972).
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correct in saying that, with the rejection of the "entity" theory, the tortfeasor spouse owns a presently vested interest in community assets. 94 The
court overlooked, however, the indivisibility of this ownership. 95 Thus.
while property belonging to the entity is not used to discharge an obligation having no relationship to the community, property belonging to the
innocent spouse is.
Ignoring the implications of the indivisibility, the court declined to
clarify the practical means of enforcement. It is unclear whether one-half
or all of the proceeds of the sale of an asset would go to satisfy the judgment. Justice Horowitz suggests that because of the "item" theory, only
one-half of any asset levied upon may be taken in satisfaction of the judgment. 96 The court did make clear that property remaining after satisfying
the judgment retains its community character. 97 Because of this community nature, if only half of the value is used, the remaining half will again
be divided in half. Therefore, the conflict with the "item" theory is still
not avoided and the innocent spouse will have had some of his or her
property used to satisfy the judgment. This destroys the reasoning of the
court that, since the property is owned by the tortfeasor, it should be subject to execution.
A more practical method would be to levy against the whole of any
asset and disregard the "item" theory in full. 98 A result would be that
additional assets would not have to be taken.
An alternative method of protecting the innocent spouse would be to
levy upon only one-half of the value of an asset, and to set aside the remaining half immediately as the separate property of the innocent
spouse. 99 This result would be consistent with both the "item" theory of
ownership 00 and the reasoning of the court, 10 1 and would ensure that the
innocent spouse will in no way contribute to the satisfaction of the sepa94. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
95. See part I.B. supra; deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 237, 251, 622 P.2d 835. 843 (1980)
(Horowitz, J., dissenting); In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 471-75, 494 P.2d 238. 242-44,
appealdenied, 80 Wn. 2d 1009 (1972).
96. deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 237, 253, 622 P.2d 835. 843 (1980) (Horowitz, J.. dissenting).
97. Id. at 246, 622 P.2d at 840.
98. The majority appears to have adopted Professor Cross's suggestion that the assets remaining
after enforcing the separate judgment retain their community character and that the innocent spouse
should be protected with the right of reimbursement. However, Professor Cross suggested that both
halves of the particular assets levied upon be used to discharge the obligation. See Cross, supra note
1, at 832.
99. See Cross, supra note 1, at 832. This would eliminate the need for the protective lien.
100. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
101. The court based its decision on the concept of ownership by the tortfeasor spouse. This
reasoning is destroyed if the innocent spouse's property is used to satisfy the judgment.
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rate tort. 102 Under the reasoning of the deElche court, however, the property remaining after satisfaction of the judgment is community in nature;
thus this alternative method of protecting the innocent spouse is not available.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The problems created by the deElche decision for contract debts, real
property, and the right of reimbursement lend validity to Justice
Horowitz's statement that such major changes in the law are best left to
the legislature. 103 On the other hand, the problem of recovery for separate
tort judgment creditors needed to be resolved. Perhaps if the court had
spent less time attempting to justify the decision in terms of existing law,
and instead had acknowledged its departure from the general scheme of
community property ownership, it would have focused on the unique
problems before it. As a result of the deElche decision, a victim of a
separate tort may now recover to the extent of the tortfeasor's one-half
interest in community personal property in addition to the tortfeasor's
separate property. The rule should be limited to this narrow application.
As to the innocent spouse's right of reimbursement, the best rule would
have been to set aside half of the value of any asset sold as the innocent
spouse's separate property. As this is impossible under the deElche analysis,I1n it is to be hoped that all of the proceeds from the sale of an asset
will be used to satisfy the judgment, rather than the half suggested by
Justice Horowitz.
ElizabethJane Blagg

102. The use of the equitable lien is essentially an adoption of the "aggregate" theory of community ownership. This theory was rejected inIn re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464,494 P.2d 238,
appealdenied, 80 Wn. 2d 1009 (1972). Under the "aggregate" theory one spouse may unilaterally
dispose of community assets to persons other than the surviving spouse, so long ;s in the long run
each spouse holds one-half of the property when viewed in the aggregate. The difficulty with applying the theory in inter vivos situations, such as in deElche, is that there is no way to ensure that
sufficient property will be available to compensate the other spouse when the community relationship
is dissolved. The deElche court attempted to some extent to deal with this difficulty by holding that
the equitable lien will protect the remaining property against subsequent separate tort creditors.
103. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
104. This is because the right of reimbursement does not arise until the community relationship is
dissolved.

